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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the stock price effects of equity offerings 
announcement with respect to the relative size of offerings and size of the 
offering firms in Hong Kong. The results demonstrates that the 
announcement of equity offerings has a negative impact on the stock price. 
We also find that relatively large size offerings, which constitute a bigger 
signal to investors, have a bigger and faster negative response on the stock 
price. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that equity issues are 
viewed by investors as negative signals, and also consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a larger price effect of larger relative size offerings 
and offerings made by larger firms due to heavier information content, and 
investors usually pay more attention to relatively larger size offerings and 
offerings by large firms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
According to academic literature on finance, firms should be able to 
raise substantial funds by issuing large amounts of equity at the current 
stock price if the market is large and efficient. Efficiency means that 
investors are pricing the firm's stock correctly based upon the risk and 
expected return associated with its future cash flows. Investors don't buy 
a stock for its unique qualities; they buy it because it offers the prospect 
of a fair return for its risk. This means that the demand for a company's 
stock should be very elastic. If one stock's prospective risk premium is 
lower relative to its risk than other stocks, nobody will want to hold that 
stock. If it is higher, everybody will want to hold it. Based on this 
argument, a stock price reduction should not be required to induce 
investors to absorb an increased supply of shares, neither should dilution 
of current earnings per share reduce stock prices when firms issue equity. 
This is because in an efficient market, investors should be able to see 
through current earning dilution and price a firm's share based upon 
expected future cash flows. As long as a firm can earn a competitive 
return on funds raised, an equity issue should be a fair deal. The value of 
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the equity issue should be exactly equal to the value created by the firm's 
investment of the proceeds leaving the stock price unchanged. However, 
recent empirical research finds that stock offerings are often associated 
with price adjustments in firm's stocks. 
Acquith and Mullins (1988) analyzed the impact of equity issues on 
stock prices. They took samples of 128 offerings of seasoned equity by 
industrial firms during the period of 1963 - 1981 in the United States. The 
result of the study found a statistically significant average two-day 
announcement period of -3.22%. Hasulis and Korwar (1986), doing the 
same study find a statistically significant average two-day announcement 
period return of -3.0% in response to the insurance of seasoned common 
stock. These research results seem to contradict the argument stated at the 
beginning of this paper. However, elastic demand does not imply that 
stock prices will never change, it does imply that you can sell a large block 
of stock at close to the current market price as long as you can convince 
investors that you have no private information. 
This means that the negative effect is due to the revised assessment 
of the stock's value. Demand may be still elastic but the whole demand 
curve can move downwards. An important study by Myron Scholes (1972) 
of a large sample of secondary offerings confirmed the ability of the market 
to absorb blocks of stock. The average effect of the offerings w as to reduce 
the stock price slightly, but the decline was almost independent of the 
amount offered. Scholes' estimate of the demand elasticity for a company's 
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stock was -3000. Of course this figure was not meant to be precise and 
some researchers have argued that demand is not as elastic as Scholes' 
study suggested. However, there seems to be widespread agreement with 
the general point that you can sell large quantities of stock at close to the 
current market price as long as other investors do not deduce that you have 
some private information. 
Then, what are the reasons behind the negative price reaction toward 
stock offering? Clifford J Smith (1986) identified five hypotheses to explain 
the pattern of relative stock price effects. (1) Optimal Capital Structure -
firms have an optimal capital structure and these price reactions reflect 
the change in value of the firm associated with the adjustment of the firm's 
liability structure; (2) Implied Cash Flow Change - the stock price changes 
provide information about future expected net operating cash flow; (3) 
Unanticipated Announcements - stock prices changes reflect only the 
unanticipated component of the aniiounceinent, hence, the more predictable 
an event, the smaller the associated stock price change; (4) Information 
Asymmetry - corporate managers have more information than the marginal 
purchaser of securities, hence, corporate managers are more likely to issue 
securities when they are overpriced in the market; (5) Ownership Changes 
-transactions that change the distribution of control rights in the firm 
effect the value of the firm's shares. 
According to Masuhis and Korwar, common stock offerings have two 
major impacts on a firm: (1) the increase in equity capital lower the 
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firm，s leverage; and (2) the proceeds are generally used to tuiaiKe capihil 
expenditures. Since most of the former researcliei's have concluded (hat 
the stock price reaction reflects more than the direct effects of the cnpil:il 
change on the nrin's casli flow, the remaining iiiuletei mined factor is 
concerned with the nature of iiiformatioii about the Hi in tluit iiuii kel 
participants infer from a capital structure ciiaii^e and use in revising (heir 
assessment of share value. 
Signalling model provides a further elaboration on the implied cash 
flow change and information asymmetry hypothesis. Accortliiij* to I>ehiiid 
and Pyle (1977)，changes in management stockholding provides a hint on 
the changing in firm value. Investors believe that inaiui^einent is better 
informed about the expected future cash flows of the company. So, they 
have incentives to hold large stock positions only if they expect the future 
cash flows to be high relative to the firm's current value. Rational 
investors will consider manager's fractional stock ownership to be a 
credible signal of firm value. Thus a decrease in managements，tVactiofuil 
shareholdings, induced by a stock offering to outside investors, is a 
negative signal about firm value. This prediction is empirically supported 
in a study of initial public of ferings of stock by Dowries and Ileinkel (1982). 
In addition, changes in outside financing are signals to investors of 
opposite changes in firm's current earnings. Miller and Rock (1885) 
derived this prediction from the firm's sources and use of funds constraint 
m 
assuming that investment decisions on average are unchanged. Thus，this 
model predicts a negative stock price reaction in the event of an equity 
offering which indicates that the firm has to rely on outside sources of 
funding. 
In the Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model, rational 
investors presume that on average managers approve stock offerings when, 
based on their superior information, they believe the stock is overvalued. 
This follows from the assumption that manager decisions are made on 
behalf of existing shareholders, who gain if additional stock is sold when 
it is overvalued and lose if additional stock is sold when it is undervalued 
relative to managers' superior information. Consequently, rational 
investors will lower their assessment of the stock's current value whenever 
a stock offering is announced. 
Agency theory models as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
predict that larger percentage shareholdings by management decrease the 
potential conflicts of interest between managers seeking to maximize wealth 
for the company and the shareholders. Thus, any increase in outstanding 
shares, which decrease management percentage shareholdings, is predicted 
to have a negative impact on firm value and stock price. The larger the 
proportional size of the stock offering, the larger the predicted negative 
effect on the firm (assuming management does not subscribe to the 
offering). 
Masulis (1983) observes that if managers adjust financial leverage to 
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maximize firm value, changes in management information regarding a 
firm's expected cash flow is signalled to investors through changes in 
leverage, given that tax rates, expected bankruptcy costs and non-debt tax 
shields are relatively stable. This can be viewed as an extension of the 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) optimal capital structure model where 
changes in firms' expected cash flows induce positive correlated changes in 
optimal leverage levels. Thus, rational investors infer that a decrease in 
leverage, caused by an equity offering possibly coupled with a decrease in 
outstanding debt, is a negative signal of firm value. 
All of these theories relating to capital structure consistently predict 
that stock offering announcements will lower stock prices; security 
offerings are viewed as examples of the lemons problem presented by Akerl 
(1970). The basic premise of these models is that information about the 
firm's earnings prospects, investment opportunities or assets in place is 
unevenly distributed between the firm's managers and investors. The 
announcement of a security offering that represents new financing conveys 
unfavourable information to the market. All these models can be viewed 
as an application of the lemons problem with a particular concern with the 
effect of information asymmetry. 
In this paper, I will focus on the Hong Kong stock market. Using 
the same method as used by most of the former researchers, I will find out 
the relationship between the stock price movement in accordance with the 
announcement of seasoned stock offerings. I expected there will be a 
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negative impact on the stock price in Hong Kong also. In addition, I will 
attempt to look into the relation between the stock price effect at the 
announcement of security offerings and the relative size of the offerings. 
There is an assumption made here between the information content and the 
size factor, such that offerings of larger relative size carry stronger signals 
than those of smaller relative size, and as a result, will have larger price 
effects. Also, because of the limitation of the offering size to 20% of 
outstanding share capital within one fiscal year, relatively large offering 
size also means relatively large size company in terms of market 
capitalization, and security offerings made by larger firms (in terms of 
market value) are believed to have a larger price effect than those made by 
smaller firms, since investors in general pay more attention to the activities 
of larger firms and their behaviour reflects the state of economy. From 
this line of reasoning, we expect to find a larger impact in the case of 




I have identified a total of 174 placement announcements by listed 
companies in Hong Kong. These included 64 in 1991，109 in 1992 and 1 
in 1993. Out of these 174 announcements, I randomly selected 87 
announcements to be the total size of this study. This represents a total 
offering size of 36.7 billion HK dollars. All the samples have conformed 
to the following criteria: 
(1) Announcement date is determined by the date when the 
announcement was first published in the Hong Kong 
Economic Journal, a reputable Chinese financial newspaper 
in Hong Kong. 
(2) No contaminating announcement must have been reported by 
the firm between 10 days before and 10 days following the 
announcement of the stock placement, such as earnings or 
restructuring announcements. 
(3) No simultaneous announcements of other financing programs 
such as preferred stock, convertible paper and warrant 
offerings occur. 
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(4) The issue is an uiidervvritteii public offering. Rights offerings 
are excluded. 
Two sub-samples will be formulated in order to test the effect on the 
relative size of the placement. The biggest 25 offerings, which account for 
87% of the total offering size of the total sample will be used to test the 
effect of large size offerings, and the smallest 25 offerings, which only 
account for 2.06% of the total offering size, will be used to test the effect 
of small size offerings. Here is an assumption that those companies in the 
big size samples are relatively large capital stock and those companies in 
the small size sample are relatively small capital stock. This is because 
Stock Exchange regulations restrict the size of the placement at a maximum 




I will apply standard event-study methodology to analyze stock price 
reaction to the announcement of stock placement. 
The specific model considered in this study is the single-index market 
model. For each security, i, the market model is used to calculate 
abnormal returns (XRs) for day t as follows: 
XRit二 R i t - � a 广biRmt) (1) 
where Rj^  and R � � a r e the rate of return on security i and the rate of return 
on the Hang Seng Index (HSI) on the event day t. The security specific 
parameters (a^  and bj) are estimated by regressing firm returns against HSI 
returns over pre-event estimation period. The estimation period is from -
151 to -31 days of the initial announcement date (t = 0). 
For each firm i and each trading day t within the event period (t = 
-30 to t = +30)，we calculate an average excess return (AXR) for the 
portfolio of n securities as follows:-
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( 2 ) 
i = l 
Complete analysis of changes in the value of the portfolio requires 
cumulation of the average excess returns over time. The cumulative excess 
returns, CARs, surrounding the period of time beginning -b days before 
the announcement of a stock offering and ending e days after the 
announcement is defined as:-
e 
CAR土二 Y^ AXR土t ( 3 ) 
Daily excess returns for the period from 30 days before the event 
through 30 days after the event were used. Examination of the CARs 
before and after the announcement date provides information on the 





Summary of my findings are shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Sub-Samples 
Total Sample Large Small 
Sample Size (n) 87 25 25 
Abnormal return 
on announcement 0.3272% -0.6500% 0.9431% 
date 
Percentage of 
negative 47.13% 60% 40% 
abnormal return 
Appreciation of 
CAR before the 5.8149% 4.9101% 11.1296% 
announcement 
Peak out day t=2 t=-l t = l 
% of declined of 
CAR from the 
announcement 
day to the end of -4.1132% -8.0340% -3.2735% 
the observation 
period 
Under the total sample of 87 announcements, the average abnormal 
return of the portfolio on the announcement date is 0.3272%. Out of the 
13 
total 87 announcements, 47.13% had a negative abnormal return on the 
announcement day. As shown in Figure 1，the cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) started climbing up from the 14th day before the announcement day 
(t = -14) and peaked out on the 2nd day after the announcement (t = 2). 
It then continuously went down, and on the 30th day after the 
announcement day (t = 30)，the CAR accounted for 2.2124%, which is 
4.8413% lower than the peak level (on t = 2，CAR is 7.0537%). 
The relatively big size offerings sub-sample posted an average 
abnormal return of -0.65% on the announcement day. Out of the 25 
announcements in this sub-sample, 60% had a negative abnormal return 
on the announcement day. As shown in Figure 2，the CAR of this sub-
sample started climbing up from the 16th day before the announcement 
day (t = -16) and peaked out on the first trading day after the 
announcement. The CAR continuously went down and became negative on 
the 17th day after the announcement (t = 17). On the last day of the 
observation period (t = 30)，CAR is -3.9407%, it is a 8.0839% decline from 
the peak. 
The relatively small size offerings sub-sample posted an average 
abnormal return of 0.9431% on the announcement day. Out of the 25 
announcements in this sub-sample, 40% had an negative abnormal return 
on the announcement day. According to Figure 3，before the CAR peaked 
out on the first trading day after the announcement, it had been 
continuously climbing up for approximately 12% since the 18th day before 
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the announcement day (t = -18). On the last trading day of the 
observation period, CAR was standing at 5.2588%, which is 3.8502% lower 
than the peak level and 7.8651% higher than the level on t = -18. 
Comparing the result of the total sample and the two sub-samples, 
you will find that the small relative offering size sub-samples enjoyed the 
biggest appreciation of abnormal return before the announcement day, and 
at the same time, it suffered the least decline of the CAR after the 
announcement day. On the contrary, the biggest relative offer size sub-
sample enjoyed the least appreciation of abnormal return before the 
announcement and suffered the biggest decline of CAR after the 
announcement day. 
The result of this study shows a slight difference from those of 
previous studies. I will try to elaborate it in the following sessions: 
Appreciation of the CAR before 
the announcement day 
The result of this study shows a sharp appreciation of CAR before 
the announcement day (as shown in Table 1). It may be due to the 
following reasons: 
(1) As mentioned by past literature, managements are more 
willing to offer a large amount of shares to the public when 
they consider the stock price is relatively higher than it should 
be. By doing so, the management can take the advantage of 
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selling shares at a higher level in order to maximize the wealth 
of the existing shareholders. Since the managements are 
expected to hold more information about the company than 
the general public, they should know the optimal level of the 
stock price. Stock placement is the most convenient method to 
take the advantage of selling a large block of overpriced 
shares. If the company has a close connection with a 
brokerage house, it can arrange a stock placement within a 
short period of preparation time. 
(2) We cannot neglect the possibilities of insider trading or 
manipulation of stock price before the announcement of stock 
offering. If the management or the big shareholders intend 
to sell a large block of shares, they may try to accumulate the 
shares at a relatively low level, then push up the stock price 
and sell out at a relatively high level. This kind of 
manipulation may not happen in large and strictly regulated 
markets such as the United States, but it is possible in a small 
and loosely regulated market like Hong Kong. 
Delay of reaction toward stock 
placement announcement 
The CAR in the sample peaked out on t = 2 instead of on the 
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announcement date. This seems quite inconsistent with those previous 
studies. Some people may suspect that it may be due to the mis-
specification of the announcement date. However, if it happened, the 
result may not be as conclusive as the current one. Since the identification 
of the announcement date is based on the report of a reputable local 
financial newspaper, it is reasonable to accept the result, and I would like 
to explain the reasons for such divergence as follows: 
(1) Listed companies usually offer a certain discount on the price 
when carrying out stock placement in Hong Kong. A less 
attractive company will offer a bigger discount in order to 
attract buyers. It may help the market to absorb the block 
selling and keep the price stable over a certain period. 
However, once the stock price drops below the placement 
price, it will trigger further selling because investors are 
convinced by the stock price performance that there must be 
some negative signal being conveyed by the placement. 
(2) Compared with the United States market，the Hong Kong 
market is less efficient. It may be due to the market size and 
the quality of investors. It takes a longer time in the Hong 
Kong stock market to absorb and fully reflect the effect of 
new information correctly. 
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Stock placement as a negative signal 
Eventually, the portfolio's CAR dropped substantially due to the 
announcement of the stock placement. As we have mentioned earlier in 
this paper, the response of investors towards a stock placement depends on 
how they infer a firm capital change and use in revising their assessment 
of share's value. No matter what the stated reasons of the placement are, 
investors will psychologically infer selling as a bad signal. In their 
experience, large shareholders will only sell blocks of shares when it is 
over-priced. The decision to sell equity is made by managements who 
possess an insiders' knowledge of the firm, its current performance and 
future prospects. To protect themselves against the risk of buying 
overvalued shares, investors mark down the stock price in response to the 
announcement that management is willing to sell equity. Indeed, this sort 
of price hedging is common in any trading situation where some 
participants are viewed as having superior information. Of course, the 
firm selling equity may simply be raising funds to finance a very profitable 
investment project. Because of the information imbalance, there may be 
no credible way to convince investors of managements' laudable motive for 
issuing equity. This kind of feeling is particularly strong toward big 
companies. When a big company asks for a big amount of cash from the 
market, not only will it tighten the liquidity of the market, investors will 
start to worry about the reason behind it. Obviously, they are not willing 
to keep the company's share since they are not certain about the future. 
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Relatively large offering size versus 
small offering size 
According to Myron Scholes (1972), markets have the ability to 
absorb blocks of stock. The average effect of the offerings was to reduce 
the stock price slightly, but the decline was almost independent of the 
amount offered. However, the results of this study are a reversal of Myron 
Scholes's view. The large size offerings sub-sample recorded a greater loss 
compared with that of the small size offerings sub-sample upon the 
announcement of stock placement. In fact, it is quite consistent with the 
Signalling model that larger size offering convey a larger signal towards 
investors, and investors are usually pay more attention to big companies. 
In this case, it is quite reasonable that a large size offering will have a 




The implications of my findings for investors and for firms raising 
capital are quite different from those previous studies. According to 
Acquith and Mullins, the negative price effect has, to a certain extent, 
discouraged firms from raising external funds to finance capital 
expenditures. However, according to the findings here, the negative price 
effect does not outweigh the advantages of companies searching for external 
financing. Since most of the issues happened during the rising of the CAR, 
companies who want to raise capital are actually enjoying an advantage in 
selling overpriced shares. This situation is especially significant on small 
companies issuing small amounts of shares. In this case, when investors 
intend to buy from a stock placement, they should be very careful. In 
most cases, investors only consider the discount of stock price offered by 
the issuer and neglect the actual price level as well as the quality of the 
company. 
In case of large companies issuing large amounts of shares, the 
findings show a more significant impact on the stock price movement. 
However, I believe the issuers still enjoy an advantage over investors on 
stock placement activities. Since the relative size of the HK stock market 
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IS still small, and regulation is quite loose when compared with the United 
States, companies or those big shareholders can enjoy the advantage of the 
existence of information imbalance between ownership and management of 
the company. The delay in the price reaction toward the announcement of 




Models from previous researchers have led us to believe that stock 
placement announcements have the following impact on stock prices: 
(1) announcement of stock offering is followed by a negative 
impact on the stock price, 
(2) and, the larger the relative size of an equity offering and the 
larger the size of the offering firm can be interpreted as 
stronger signals to the investors and as a result, the impact on 
the price effect will be greater than their counterparts. 
The result of my study is quite consistent to the above mentioned 
results but does not totally conform with them. It is different from those 
previous studies in the following magnitudes: 
(1) the negative reaction of the stock price happened on the third 
trading day (t = 3 ) instead of the event day (t=0). 
(2) there is a substantial increase in the abnormal return on the 
portfolio before the stock placement announcement which is 
not observed in previous studies. 
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In the previous sections, I have tried to explain the reasons for such 
differences. Due to insufficient manpower and time, the result of this 
study may not be conclusive, however, I hope the work done here will draw 
the interest of other people to this issue, I am looking forward to see a 
more in-depth and conclusive study on the price effect on stock placement 
announcements in the Hong Kong stock market. Possible areas for the 
extension of this research are as follows: 
(1) Since this study finds a sharp appreciation of the CAR before 
the announcement of placement, a study of the information 
asymmetry seems very interesting. 
(2) The study would be more specific if one can identify the stated 
reason for each stock placement. Through cross study of the 
price effect of different samples with different stated reasons 
of financing, you can see how investors respond to stock 
placement with different reasoning. 
(3) Because of the loosening of regulations, there is an increasing 
popularity of stock placement over rights issues in HK. 
Compared to placement, rights issues require more legal and 
preparation work and higher transaction costs. A comparison 
of the stock price effect between stock placement and rights 
issues is quite interesting. By this comparison, we can 
discover whether investors hold a different view towards 
23 
placement and rights issues. 
(4) A study of the behaviour of the investment public towards 
company financing programs would be very helpful for a 
company in making a financing decision. What is the most 
important consideration of investors when they decided to buy 
a placement? Is the price discount more important than the 








































































































































































































































顶丁从 BIG RELATIVE SMALL RELATIVE 
SAMPLE SIZE SIZE 
(N = 87) (N = 25) (N = 25) 
DAY ARS CARS ARS CARS ARS CARS 
-30 0.0119 0.0119 0.5955 0.5955 -0.9304 - 0.9304 
-29 -0.1521 -0.1402 0.1247 0.7202 -0.6919 -1.6223 
-28 0.2256 0.0855 -0.2089 0.5114 0.8503 - 0.7720 
一 27 0.3766 0.4620 1.1454 1.6568 0.6169 - 0.1551 
-26 -0.1539 0.3081 -0.2120 1.4448 -0.4181 -0.5733 
-25 0.3870 0.6951 0.0439 1.4886 0.4385 - 0.1348 
-24 0.3197 1.0148 - 0.4048 1.0838 0.9615 0.8268 
-23 0.5261 1.5409 - 0.3329 0.7509 0.7345 1.5612 
-22 - 0.1843 1.3566 0.0298 0.7807 -0.6213 0.9399 
一 21 - 0 . 5 5 6 7 0.8000 -0.0120 0.7687 -1.6501 -0.7102 
-20 - 0.5842 0.2157 0.0147 0.7835 - 0.9084 -1.6185 
-19 0.2053 0.4210 - 0.1410 0.6425 0.6259 - 0.9927 
-18 —0.0349 0.3861 -0.0572 0.5853 -1.6046 —2.5973 
-17 0.0622 0.4483 -1.0704 - 0.4852 0.4517 - 2.1456 
-16 0.0206 0.4689 -0.3317 -0.8168 -0.0538 -2.1994 
-15 0.0288 0.4976 1.0753 0.2584 0.3067 -1.8926 
-14 0.0131 0.5107 0.4503 0.7087 0.4553 -1.4374 
-13 0.3803 0.8910 0.0284 0.7371 0.7476 - 0.6898 
-12 0.4989 1.3S99 -0.2812 0.4559 0.4436 -0.2462 
-11 0.4142 1.8041 0.7835 1.2394 0.6429 0.3967 
-10 0.6557 2.4598 0.2508 1.4902 1.2589 1.6556 
-9 0.6113 3.0711 -0.4487 1.0415 0.2370 1.8926 
-8 0.6525 3.7236 0.7585 1.8000 1.0488 2.9413 
-7 -0.0385 3.6851 0.1180 1.9180 -0.5737 2.3676 
-6 0.0300 3.7151 -0.4424 1.4756 0.8542 3.2218 
-5 - 0.206 7 3.5084 0.5419 2.0175 0.1755 3.3973 
一 4 0.4046 3.9130 0.2960 2.3135 0.3563 3.7537 
-3 0.6530 4.5659 0.6194 2.9329 1.2750 5.0287 
-2 0.5115 5.0774 0.7807 3.7136 0.8898 5.9185 
-L 0.7945 5.S719 1.0296： 4.7432 1.6706 7.5891 
0 0.4537 6 3 2 5 6 -0.6500： 4.0933 0.9431 8 5323 ：-..；..• •• ：-：-： • ••-••：-： • • . ... • , ....... . -.. - . . . . . . . . . . . ‘ • .-:-•- . . . •.••:. ‘ '：,".. • .... 
1 0.1327 6.4583 -0.6920 3.4012 0.5767 9.1090 
2 0.5954 7.0537 0.2586 3.6598 - 0.2631 8.8459 
3 - 0.5015 6.5522 - 0.3182 3.3416 0.1517 8.9976 
4 -0.0903 6.4619 -0.3516 2.9900 -0.4735 8.5242 
5 0.1662 6.6280 -0.3873 2.6027 -0.0431 8.4811 
6 -0.1198 6.5082 -0.0656 2.5371 -0.5929 7.8882 
7 -0.5941 5.9141 -0.8873 1.6498 -0.3614 7.5268 
8 -0.2962 5.6179 -0.0830 1.5667 -0.1585 7.3683 
9 0.3512 5.9691 0.5168 2.0836 -0.3345 7.0337 
10 -0.0656 5.9035 0.1327 2.2162 -0.1112 6.9225 
11 -0.2S03 5.6232 -0.4227 1.7935 -0.0897 6.8328 
12 - 0.2065 5.4167 - 0.3523 1.4412 0.9703 7.8030 
13 - 0.266 1 5.1506 - 0.0424 1.3988 - 0.3094 7.4937 
14 -0.2320 4.9186 -0.5787 0.8201 -0.3100 7.1837 
15 - 0.3163 4.6022 - 0.6055 0.2146 0.1075 7.2912 
16 -0.2463 4.3559 -0.3715 -0.1568 -0.6075 6.6837 
17 0.0725 4.4285 0.2466 0.0898 - 0.2407 6.4430 
18 -0.0171 4.4113 -0.3835 -0.2938 0.3465 6.7896 
19 -0.0329 4.3784 -0.3469 -0.6407 0.0126 6.8021 
20 -0.63SS 3.7396 -0.0766 -0.7173 -0.7510 6.0511 
21 -0.2193 3.5203 - 0.4093 -1.1266 0.3477 6.3988 
22 0.1179 3.6382 -0.3353 -1.4618 0.4220 6.8207 
23 - 0 . 2 6 3 8 3.3743 -0.4691 -1.9310 -丨1.;291 6.4916 
24 - 0.2674 3.1070 - 0.3295 - 2.2605 - 0.O9S1 5.7935 
25 -0.2413 2.8656 -0.3512 -2.6117 -0 2362 5.5514 
26 -0.61S5 2.2472 -0.5236 - 3.1353 -0.7186 4.8387 
27 0.3951 2.6422 0.3223 - 2.8129 1 丨从<5 6.0333 
28 -0.4764 2.1658 -0.7161 -3.5290 -0 6018 5.4315 
29 0.0311 2.1969 -0.5449 -4.0739 0J 了86 5.8101 
30 0.0154 2.2124 0.1332 -3.9407 -0.5513 5.2588 
28 
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